REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: POWER POLITICS AND COOPERATION

Abstract

This study examines the relationship among realism and global corporations (IOs), with a particular emphasis on how countrywide interests and power politics impact collaboration within international organizations, which include the IMF, World Trade Organization, and the UN. It makes the case that, despite their  seeming promotion of cooperation, IOs are frequently sites of strategic competition, drawing on the realism tradition in international relations theory. Powerful nations utilize voting systems and veto power to further their national interests, and states employ these institutions to further their own geopolitical agendas. The study emphasizes how mistrust and worries over relative gains limit collaboration, making it frequently conditional and short-lived. In order to overcome the chaos and self-interest that dominate international interactions, the study illustrates the limitations of institutional governance. The results highlight the continued applicability of realist theory by demonstrating that the efficacy of IOs is determined by power relations rather than group values. The study ends with a discussion of how new issues, such as non-state actors and cyber governance, call for a sophisticated view of collaboration in a changing geopolitical environment.