ABRAHAM ACCORDS AND ITS IMPACT IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH

Abstract

A major change in the Middle East's geopolitical landscape was brought about by the 2020 Abraham Accords, which promoted the normalization of ties between Israel and several Arab nations, notably Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. The strategic effects of the Accords on the stability, alliances, and power dynamics of the region are examined in this study using a game-theoretical method. The article assesses how the Accords changed the incentive structures for major participants, including Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Iran, and outside actors like the United States, by presenting the Middle East as a complicated game of cooperation, competition, and confrontation. The article evaluates the normalization accords' effects on regional cooperation and rivalry while examining the reasons behind them, including economic incentives, safety considerations, and counterbalancing Iran's influence. It also looks into whether the Accords have heightened already-existing tensions in the Middle East or brought about a stable equilibrium. In addition to providing insights into possible future scenarios, such as changes in U.S. engagement, the significance of proxy conflicts, and the changing dynamics of Arab-Israeli relations, the research emphasizes the interaction of strategic alliances, signaling, and rational decision-making. Lastly, the strategic calculations underlying the Abraham Accords and their wider ramifications for peace, conflict, and the balance of power in the Middle East can be better understood using a game-theoretical lens.