

## BRIDGING THE GAP: STRENGTHENING KARACHI'S LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

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### Abstract

This research examines the deficiencies in the law enforcement capacity in Karachi to fight terrorism. The Introduction highlights the escalating nature of the threat of terrorism and the central role of law enforcement organizations. The Background discusses the history of terrorism in Karachi and the misfortunes of the security forces. The Structure delineates the divisions of the study, including a literature review, methodology, findings, and policy recommendations for reform. Literature review presents a detailed critique of the available scholarly research on counter-terrorism issues confronting law enforcement agencies in Karachi, with specific reference to training gaps, technological capability, and inter-agency cooperation. The research model examines capacity gaps, while the research framework provides an interface between capacity gaps and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies in Karachi. Discussion and results section addresses the findings that were concluded from evidence on Karachi police forces' capacity deficits. The major findings are established as major deficits in training, technical capacities, and inter-agency coordination. Such deficits are contrasted with less effectiveness in counter-terrorism efforts by the discussion and illustrates how to fill them would enhance Karachi's security regime in general. The conclusion encapsulates the results of the study, pinpointing the wide gaps in training, technology, and inter-agency collaboration in Karachi's law enforcement agencies. Closing these gaps will help improve the efficiency of counter-terrorism. References section consists of scholarly articles on law enforcement, terrorism, and capacity-building, thus validating the analytical framework of the study as well as the recommendations.

## INTRODUCTION

Karachi, the economic and strategic center of Pakistan's biggest city, is a metropolitan city with huge economic and strategic importance. But it has been plagued by all forms of violence, including terrorism, for a long time. Law enforcement agencies of the city, including the police, Rangers, the Army, and other paramilitary forces, are tasked with upholding law and order and combating terrorism. Despite their best efforts, there are significant capacity shortfalls in their efforts. These are the insufficient manpower and training, and the ratio of population to police officer is such that it is not able to carry out effective patrols and security of the city. The officers are also short of specialized training for counter-terror operations, intelligence gathering, and crisis management. The police agencies even do not have modern firearms, vehicles, and communication devices, which are substandard for counter-terrorism operations. Attempts at outreach and winning the support of the locals are often weak, leading to alienation and suspicion. In addition, the existing legal system may be too weak to handle terrorism cases as they ought to be handled, and judicial inefficiencies, delays, and inadequate resources lead to excessive detention of suspects before trial or premature release of dangerous criminals. To overcome these obstacles, it is necessary to improve the performance of law enforcement organizations in Karachi by a multi-dimensional strategy. This includes increasing manpower, providing specialized training, providing adequate funds for modern equipment and facilities, strengthening intelligence gathering capabilities, and strengthening the judicial and legal system. It is only through comprehensive reforms that Karachi can hope to ward off the omnipresent threat of terrorism in an effective way.

### Background:

Capacity imbalances within the law enforcement organizations of Karachi, Pakistan, in the war against terrorism are complex and encompass numerous institutional, operational, and resource-level issues. Institutions struggle with inefficient coordination among the law enforcement organs like the police, Rangers, Army, and intelligence organizations that result in inadequate sharing of information and lacking intelligence. Corruption by these organizations also taints investigations and dealing

with sensitive information, undermining efforts against terrorism. Training and development opportunities are generally insufficient and obsolete, and they fail to prepare law enforcers with contemporary methods and strategies of counteracting complex terrorist threats.

Operationally, inadequate intelligence capacity and insufficient technology equipment undermine the capacity of law enforcement agencies to anticipate and prevent violent activity. Poor critical equipment and logistics also constrain their ability to be ready to respond quickly and effectively to terrorist attacks.

The legal and structural framework also proves to be demanding, featuring inconsistencies in its structures, such as obsolete legislations and rules, which keep the effective application of anti-terrorist campaigns and prosecutions away. Budgets, such as minimal funding, limit the access to purchase technologically advanced weapons, equipment, and technology essential for counter-terrorist drives. Human resources limitation, such as inadequate personnel training and available units for specialist counter-terrorist activities, compound the challenge. Infrastructure problems, such as dilapidated police headquarters and poor telecommunications networks, undermine the overall productivity of law enforcement agencies. Relationships with the people are also crucial, as diminished public trust in law enforcement gives way to poor cooperation, vital for intelligence activities and combating radicalization. There is also the lack of programs for community policing that further downgrades the quality of the police-public relationship.

Political interference in police operations can result in discriminatory or ineffective operations against some groups and thus create additional gaps in counter-terrorism. Socioeconomic factors like poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy fuel radicalization, and it is difficult for the police to target the root causes of violence. Closing these gaps in capacity requires international cooperation, training initiatives, and embracing new models and equipment. Institutional and legal strengthening and community outreach and public awareness are the most important prerequisites for building trust and cooperation between the public and law enforcement.

These are needed to enhance the effectiveness of counter-terrorism in Karachi and beyond.

Findings from the study of capacity gaps in Karachi's police system reveal three major deficiencies. Firstly, training gaps exist because law enforcement officials have no specialist counter-terrorism training, severely impairing their capacity for addressing terror threats. Second, technological constraints interfere with operational efficacy, through poor access to advanced surveillance and intelligence technologies. Third, coordination lapses between security institutions bring about inefficiency in counter-terrorist responses, further worsening the problem for law enforcers.

In the analysis and discussion, failures are ascribed to the inefficiency of the counter-terror operations in Karachi as a whole. The lack of modern technology and inter-agency co-operation results in non-optimal or delayed responses. It is imperative to rectify these failures with more training, technological development, and better co-operation between the agencies to enhance the police force to counter terrorism in the city.

The Karachi situation is still extremely complex and difficult to resolve after thirty years of bloodshed. But since the commencement of the ongoing operation, drastic changes have been witnessed. The city is now operating free from the usual threats of shutdowns and boycotts that used to be an order of the day in past years. Although there are sporadic instances of targeted killings, the government, with the coordination of law enforcement agencies, has made a strong attempt to eradicate terrorism and rein in threats and peril. Now, it is anticipated that the country will be more stable and achieve permanent victory.

Karachi, the biggest and most cosmopolitan city of Pakistan, is the country's commercial center. But it has also been a hub of different terrorist activities, such as political murders, ethnic violence, sectarian violence, and organized crimes. The composite social makeup and geographical position of the city have transformed it into a hub of such activities. Law and order enforcing organizations, especially the police and paramilitary force, are the main

institutions that have the mandate of maintaining the city peaceful and addressing these threats.

Thirty years of war since then, Karachi's situation remains complicated and hard to control. But from the time the current operation started, things have markedly improved. As opposed to previous years, when shutdowns and boycotts were a common scenario, the city is now running relatively normally. Although the targeted assassinations remain occasional, the government, assisted by security agencies, has been determined to continue to combat terrorism until it is eradicated entirely. The country now looks forward to achieving more stability and final victory (Saleem et al., 2019).

Studies on counter-terrorism in Karachi have identified gaps in the capacity of law enforcement agencies, including the police, Intelligence Bureau (IB), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), and paramilitary forces. These gaps create critical challenges to effective counter-terrorism. The literature highlights structural reforms, such as capacity building for the judiciary and police, the use of new techniques in investigations, and procedural law reforms for improving counter-terrorism. Secondly, anti-terrorism steps ought to be reforming anti-terrorism legislation in order to cater to changing security trends in the region and enact exhaustive legislation so that loopholes are addressed. Capacity-building measures, as examined in literature, have a key position in counteracting such loopholes and supporting advocated reforms. Such steps, by means of these measures, Karachi police agencies will be able to increase their response in combating terrorism.

Saleem et al. (2019) carried out the study with the objective of determining the effect of terrorism in Karachi, Pakistan, on the stock market. The research indicated that three out of twelve significant terrorist attacks had a negative effect on stock returns. This study assists in measuring the economic effect of terrorist attacks since stock markets in all economies are vulnerable to news in domestic and foreign settings. The results of this study have been observed to be insightful.

## Research Framework:

<p><b><u>Lack of Training and skills development</u></b></p> <p>(Marsden, 2014) (Enders &amp; Sandler, 2011) (Della Porta, 2008) (Hoffman, 2002)</p> <p>Resource mobilization theory</p>		<p><b><u>Lack of resource allocation</u></b></p> <p>(Turner, 2024) (Sandler, 2023) (Berman &amp; Laitin, 2008) (Frey et al., 2008)</p> <p>Public goods theory</p>
<p><b><u>Lack of technological capabilities</u></b></p> <p>(Hess &amp; Falkenstein, 2020) (Sageman, 2014) (Kenney, 2014) (Hoffman, 1994)</p> <p>Technological Determinism</p>	<p><b><u>Lack of Legal and policy framework</u></b></p> <p>(Stern, 2016) (Dworkin, 2004) (Heymann, 2001) (Huntington, 1997)</p> <p>Rational choice theory</p>	<p><b><u>Lack of Intelligence gathering and sharing</u></b></p> <p>(Chen et al., 2022) (Gartenstein-Ross et al., 2019) (Li et al., 2019) (Pedahzur, 2011)</p> <p>Network theory</p>

## Results and Discussion:

Table 01: Frequency and percentage distribution of respondents based on their role in law enforcement

Role in law enforcement	Frequency	Percentage
Crime investigator	5	25%
Probation officer	4	20%
Correctional officer	5	25%
Other career in Law enforcement	6	30%
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100%</b>

The most common category, representing 30% of the sample, was other law enforcement occupations. Crime investigators and correctional officers each represented 25% of the sample, and probation

officers represented 20% of the sample. These findings are based on a sample of 20 participants and reflect the variance of careers in the law enforcement industry.

**Table 02: Frequency and percentage distribution of respondents by years of service in law enforcement**

Years served in law enforcement	Frequency	Percentage
5-10	6	30%
10-15	3	15%
15-20	5	25%
20-30	6	30%
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100%</b>

The majority category of the respondents was 30% in the 5-10 and 20-30 years of service category. This was followed by 25% of the respondents in the 15-20

years of service category. 15% of the respondents were in the 10-15 years of service category.

**Table 03: Frequency and percentage distribution of respondents based on their observations regarding steps already taken to control terrorism**

Steps taken to control terrorism	Frequency	Percentage
Collaboration between law enforcement and community leaders	5	25%
Increase the police patrolling	4	20%
Installing the CCTV cameras	6	30%
Utilization of advance technology for monitoring	5	25%
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100%</b>

To address respondents' observations on steps already taken to control terrorism, the study revealed that the most commonly observed step was the installment of CCTV cameras, viewed by 30% of respondents. The second one was co-operation

between law enforcers and community leaders, and utilization of contemporary technology for monitoring, each viewed by 25% of respondents. Apart from this, 20% of the respondents mentioned enhanced police patrols as a measure in place.

**Table 04: Frequency and percentage distribution of respondents' recommended key steps to control terrorism**

Recommended key steps to control terrorism	Frequency	Percentage
Enhancing information sharing among agencies	3	15%
Improving collaboration with educational institutions on counter terrorism	3	15%
Stepping up intelligence gathering	5	25%
Enhancing cyber security and surveillance	7	35%
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100%</b>

Regarding the recommendations based on respondents' views of effective approaches to terrorism prevention, the most commonly suggested response was enhancing cyber security and surveillance, suggested by 35% of respondents. It was seconded by stepping up intelligence gathering, **Gaps of law enforcement**

The findings from the research reveal areas of importance that have crystallized, as determined by priorities expressed by the respondents. An

suggested by 25% of respondents. Additionally, 15% of respondents suggested enhancing information sharing among agencies, and 15% of respondents suggested stepping up collaboration with educational institutions within the context of counter-terrorism.

overwhelming majority (30%) of the respondents cited the importance of traffic control and first aid certification, which highlights the importance of traditional skills for handling immediate emergencies.

In addition, 20% of the respondents mentioned physical fitness and cybersecurity skills, showing a subtle dance between critical physical preparedness and technical competences in modern security configurations.

On independent analysis of the data, 30% of the respondents highlighted the most important requirement for the provision of sophisticated weapons, showing an international desire to be equipped with updated means for the attainment of maximum operational efficiency. The second major emphasis arises from 25% of the respondents highlighting a requirement for proper staff, indicating that human resources are seen as a vital consideration for maximum operational success. Besides, 20% of the respondents mentioned the imperative need for office machinery and legal requirements as emphasizing the significance of both logistical infrastructure and legal provisions to facilitate the free flow of operations.

#### **Effectiveness of law enforcement**

The thematic coding of the current study identifies some of the most important findings. Most of the respondents (35%) saw the improvement of efficiency as the most important factor. Secondly, 25% of the respondents noted the slow speed of investigations as a most important issue, followed by 20% noting crime reduction and 20% noting speeding up arrests. These findings indicate the importance of enhancing process optimization in the justice system to enhance outcomes.

In another set of answers, 30% of the sample provided an argument that all these variables call for a synthesis. In addition, 25% cited inadequate legal powers as a major issue, and 20% cited absence of well-defined anti-terrorism policy and disparate application of available legislations as major issues. This shows that in addition to operational inefficiency, structural and policy-based issues are paralyzing the effectiveness of law enforcement and counter-terrorism efforts.

#### **What are abilities in Karachi law enforcement?**

The results of the research provide insight into dominant themes that relate to problems faced by the participants. The largest percentage (30%) noted political interference as the most prevailing problem, indicating the role played by political considerations

in determining effectiveness in operations. A further 25% emphasized the insufficiency of adequate funds, noting that budgetary constraints impede efforts to successfully counter security concerns. In addition, 20% of the participants cited effective support in communication and interagency collaboration as key influences, highlighting interagency collaboration for alleviating adversity. Importantly, 30% of the participants further observed that all the factors—funding shortages, political interference, and poor interagency collaboration—are key determiners of the context. In addition, 25% complained about the lack of adequate legal powers, which can limit the scope of law enforcement and policy enforcement. Finally, 20% reported the lack of clear-cut anti-terrorism policies and unequal enforcement of current rules, pointing to gaps in governance and regulatory systems. Combined, the results indicate that the cumulative political, financial, and legal determinants are the cause of the chronic problems, and the interviewees demanded greater policy clarity, coordination, and funding.

With regard to law enforcement in Karachi, political meddling and lack of funds are the primary issues noted. Also, functional ability is eroded by a shortage of clear anti-terrorism policy and lack of appropriate legal sanction.

#### **Conclusion:**

The capacity deficits of the law enforcement agencies in Karachi, including the police, rangers, and air force, severely impede effective counter-terrorism operations. These deficits are a result of inherent flaws in the criminal justice system, including inadequate coordination and procedural failures.

Police, prosecution, and judiciary work in silos and hence attribute blames to each other in a self-defeating manner rather than cooperating to fight terror. Institutional rivalry among the agencies aggravates the prosecution problems leading to high acquittal rates.

The dominant paradigm of law also tends to fall behind and does not capture the dynamism of terrorism, leaving loopholes which are difficult to maneuver for the law enforcement agencies. The dichotomy between legal formalism and norms also makes enforcement difficult, for example, in the case of resisting legal reforms that do not align with community expectations.



Thus, whereas law enforcers in Karachi suffer from the actual capacity gap issues, a fair solution addressing such issues will entail promoting inter-agency cooperation as well as refining the legal regimes to properly fit current realities.

Finally, the law enforcement units of Karachi, i.e., the police, rangers, and air force, all suffer from such capacity gaps significantly impacting their role of being effective counter-terrorism operatives in the truest sense of the phrase. These shortfalls are seen in various dimensions, such as training gaps, deployment of resources, technology access, and challenges in inter-agency collaboration and information exchange. The differences in legal frameworks and jurisdictional authorities also contribute to the intricacy of their collaborative efforts. In order to overcome these challenges, a concerted effort is necessary, including improved training, rationalized resource deployment, improved communication channels, and strengthened legal and procedural frameworks. Bridging these gaps will be the main agenda to improve the overall security and resilience of Karachi against terrorism.

These gaps in the all-around law enforcement effort against terrorism are mainly weighed down by widespread capacity deficits. These gaps are felt in training, equipment, technological capacity, and inter-agency coordination imbalances. Inadequate free-flowing intelligence sharing and communication, and jurisdictional and legal barriers, also contribute to their operational challenges. It is necessary to resolve these problems with more effective means to establish a robust security framework in Karachi and to possess an integrated and more effective response to the terrorism threat.

There are several challenges that are negatively impacting the effectiveness of policing in our society, especially in Karachi, and those problems must be resolved so that law enforcement agencies can become effective. The role of the police and their significance in the context of preventing, reducing, and controlling crime is unquestionable. For making the police force more efficient, their fundamental structure needs to be overhauled in a comprehensive context. Counter-terrorism is not only being confronted by Pakistan but is a worldwide phenomenon, and it is necessary that all countries make collective efforts to counter this challenge. The

role of the Pakistan police in fighting terrorism is vital, as most of its personnel have been killed in doing so—more than any other law enforcement agency in the world. The Karachi police has also become far more efficient in fighting terrorism. A new Special Combat Unit (SCU) and anti-terrorism unit have been set up to fight this critical challenge more efficiently. The state of law and order within the country has improved significantly, and individuals feel a sense of greater security while in public places.

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